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T HERE is a now-standard debate about law and the Internet.
One side asserts that the Internet is so new and different that it
calls for new legal approaches, even its own sovereign law. The
other side argues that, although it is a new technology, the Internet
nonetheless presents familiar legal problems. It is a battle of analo-
gies: One side refers to Cyberspace as a place, while the other es-
sentially equates the Internet and the telephone.
In my view, these two positions are both wrong and right: wrong
in their characterization of the Internet as a whole, yet potentially
right about particular ways of using the Internet. The real problem
is that both sides (and indeed, most legal writing) rely on a singular
model of the Internet. They take one way of using the Internet as
a proxy for the whole thing and conclude "the Internet this" or
"the Internet that."
In earlier times, this simplification worked. Then, the Internet
was new and less diverse. But today, most noticeably for purposes
of legal analysis, the singular model is failing. In actual usage, on
which legal questions usually turn, the Internet does not generalize
well. The Internet is only the genus, the application, the species;
applications can and do vary dramatically. To the user, the Inter-
net comes in many incarnations-email, the World Wide Web,
ICQ,' and more. A singular model of Internet usage has become
too small to captufe the dramatic diversity of today's Internet.
* Clerk to Justice Stephen Breyer, Supreme Court of the United States, 1999-2000.
J.D., Harvard Law School, 1998; B.Sc., McGill University, 1995. The author would
like to thank Larry Lessig for providing very helpful feedback and the opportunity to
develop these ideas; Israel Friedman, Jack Goldsmith, Richard A. Posner, Eric Pos-
ner, Robert Sitkoff, and Polk Wagner for extremely helpful comments and sugges-
tions; and the members of the Dirksen Paper Talk Group, where this Essay was first
presented.
I For a description of ICQ, see infra note 103.
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Accordingly, I would like to suggest an upgrade. For most pur-
poses, I think we ought to discard the old talk of the Internet as a
whole, for the whole Internet is rarely an appropriate level on
which to generalize. Instead, legal thinking can better focus on
where the variation that is apparent to the user is actually found:
the application layer above the Internet's basic protocols. We need,
I think, to focus on the user, not on the network, and that means
legal analysis that begins with the application.
What's the difference? This seemingly technical point matters
because the Internet by its design allows-even encourages-great
diversity above a few basic standards. The "end-to-end" design of
the Internet delegates the power to code function to the point
nearest to the user: the application. As a result, nearly everything
that "counts" about the Internet from a legal standpoint is a func-
tion of the particular application at issue and not of the basic Inter-
net protocols. Since applications actually drive Internet usage,
they ought also drive legal analysis of the Internet, yielding nu-
anced rather than stereotyped results.
The crucial point to understand is that the Internet was expressly
designed to put the application in charge. (Importantly, by this I
mean the application, broadly conceived-the programs them-
selves (e.g., email, telnet, browsers, etc.) and their associated pro-
tocols; in other words, everything above the basic Internet
standards.) The Internet, like many networks, has a layered archi-
tecture. That is to say, all the tasks necessary to communicating via
network are divided among several functional layers, and the pro-
grams residing on these layers cooperate in standardized ways.
Applications and their associated protocols occupy a layer above
the basic Internet protocols that supervise basic data transmission.
And so we can see that the designers of the Internet had a real
choice about where to place the functionality of the network-how
much freedom to give to the application and how much control to
maintain through the low level protocols. The monumental
choice-expressed famously as a design principle in Jerome Salt-
zer, David Reed, and David Clark's "end-to-end" design argu-
ment--was to make the basic Internet protocols simple, general,
2 Jerome H. Saltzer et al., End-to-End Arguments in System Design, 2 ACM
Transactions in Computer Systems 277 (1984), reprinted in Innovations in Internet-
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and open, leaving the power and functionality in the hands of the
application. As a recent comment by the same authors explains,
"Moving functions and services upward in a layered design, closer
to the application(s) that use them, increases the flexibility and
autonomy of the application designer to apply those functions and
services to the specific needs of the application."0 The impact of
the end-to-end design principle, embedded in the architecture of
the Internet, is crucial to any analysis of the Internet, and legal
analysis is no exception.
To understand this point, just think of the "network" of appli-
ances in your home: They all use the same standard of electricity
(the basic protocol), but then widely differ in what they offer the
user. A television offers something quite different than the power
saw, even though both use 110 volts of electricity. This is the result
of a deliberate choice. The design of the electricity "network" puts
most of the power to decide functionality in the hands of the appli-
ance designer. The Internet, conceptually, is not all that different.
Contrast this with the telephone network, where nearly everything
that matters about the telephone comes from the basic standards to
which all telephones adhere. The difference between these net-
works is the result of a deliberate and important decision, and one
that cannot but have a decisive impact on the legal analysis of any
network. The Interlude between Part I and Part II explains these
points in greater detail.
working 195 (Craig Partridge ed., 1988). "End-to-end" arguments are referred to as
such because they recognize that a class of functions can only be completely and cor-
rectly implemented by the applications at each end of a network communication;
hence, delegation of this function to lower protocols will generally be redundant. Put
another way, end-to-end design arguments recognize that building complex functions
into lower levels of a network implicitly optimizes the network for one set of uses but
may then increase the costs of the network for uses that were unpredictable or un-
known at the time the network is designed. The end-to-end design principle is fea-
tured prominently in the helpful summary of "Architectural Principles of the
Internet" in RFC ("Request for Comments") 1958 (visited July 13, 1999) <http:ll
www.faqs.orglrfcs/rfc1958.html>; see also infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text
(discussing the end-to-end design principle).




The purpose of this Essay is to encourage a legal analysis that is
more cognizant of the effects of the Internet's network architec-
ture. That architecture provides, and even encourages, a rich and
diverse universe of possible applications, foreclosing simple gener-
alization of the Internet as a whole. For this reason, much legal
analysis ought usually begin at the level of the Internet's individual
applications, and not at the level of "Cyberspace." What this ulti-
mately means is an analysis that focuses on the user, and how the
Internet actually appears to the user, rather than an abstract focus
on the network as a whole.
This richer focus on Internet usage makes things a little more
complicated. Therefore, the second purpose of this Essay is to
suggest coherent ways to think about and to classify the parts of the
Internet-to dissect in legally relevant ways the universe of existing
and possible Internet applications. Sometimes it makes sense to
look at applications individually; other times, applications can be
grouped by functional characteristics or by adherence to certain
protocols; and in certain cases every application that adheres to
the Internet's standards will be affected similarly, making an
analysis of the whole Internet reasonable. I suggest two tools for
grouping applications in this Essay that correspond to two main
areas of Internet law, though the field for grouping applications is
open.
Two main areas where the law and the Internet have met-proxies
for public and private regulation questions, respectively-
demonstrate the great difference that an application-centered
analysis makes. Part I considers the First Amendment analysis of
the Internet, a discussion that stands as representative for any issue
of public regulation of the Internet. Part II brings application-
specific methods to the now-historical debate over whether some
form of strong self-governance makes sense for the Internet. This
discussion, in turn, is representative of questions of private, con-
tractual regulation of the Internet.
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Two years ago, in Reno v. ACLU,4 the Supreme Court an-
nounced that the Internet receives full First Amendment protec-
tion.5 This proclamation was a tremendous victory; so phrased it
tells us that everything at the application level-email, the World
Wide Web, Usenet,6 and "finger" 7-will receive the most exacting
judicial attention. But our enthusiasm ought be realistic. Sooner
or later, because these applications (your browser, email, and so
on) vary quite dramatically from a functional perspective, Reno's
one rule for the entire Internet may begin to lose its luster and
perhaps feel ridiculous. The great variation among Internet
applications is hard to fit into one First Amendment box. Just
as there is no argument that electricity compels similar treatment
of the television and the fax machine under the First Amend-
ment, treating every Internet-adherent application as part of a
single domain of First Amendment analysis can look a little far-
fetched.
For an illustration of the problem with the Reno simplification,
look no further than your email inbox. Reno v. ACLU tells us that
"'[c]ommunications over the Internet do not 'invade' an individ-
ual's home or appear on one's computer screen unbidden.' 8 But
this is only true of some applications. Junk email is invasive in
ways that the World Wide Web is not, and hence Reno's simplified
treatment of the Internet has little resonance for anyone who suf-
521 U.S. 844 (1997).
See infra Section I.A.
6 "Usenet" is the name of the largest "discussion group" accessible by the Internet.
It consists of electronic bulletin boards devoted to specific topics, where users, using a
specific program (a "news reader" client), may read postings or make their own con-
tributions. Usenet and electronic bulletin boards were a dominant feature of the
Internet and other networks in the 1980s and early 1990s, but the advent of the com-
mercialization of the Internet and the rise of the World Wide Web have left much
(though not all) of Usenet a burnt-out shell full of crass solicitation. There is no
shortage of historical studies on this 20-year-old application. See, e.g., Michael
Hauben & Ronda Hauben, On the Early Days of Usenet: The Roots of the Coopera-
tive Online Culture (visited July 13, 1999) <http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/
issue3_8/chapterlO/index.html>; Tim North, The Internet and Usenet Global Com-
puter Networks (1994) <http://www.vianet.net.au/-timn/thesis/index.html>.
7 "Finger" is an Internet-compliant application that allows the user to look up the
vital stats of another Internet user. Its name is metaphorical: One "fingers" an ad-
dress in the Internet "white pages."




fers under an invasion of thousands of "get rich quick" schemes
(and worse) in their inboxes. When a serious constitutional chal-
lenge is made to junk email legislation, it seems inevitable that a
reduced level of constitutional scrutiny for email will follow, justi-
fied, ultimately, by its invasive nature. And this suggests an easy, if
rough, principle for classifying Internet applications for First
Amendment purposes. Privacy-invasive applications that deliver
content unbidden-most often, "push" applications-should merit
reduced First Amendment scrutiny. Yet noninvasive applications-
usually "pull" applications that rely on the user to go out and select
content-fit Reno's conception of a noninvasive Internet and the
analysis that follows.
The distinction between push and pull applications is just an ex-
ample. The point is that Internet applications vary too greatly to
be grouped within one single First Amendment category. And
similar overly simplified analysis of the Internet is a problem not
only in First Amendment case law, but in much Internet scholar-
ship. Finally, when it comes to debates over filtering, PICS,9 and
similar issues, the effects of the Internet's current network architec-
ture ought not be overlooked.
The discussion in Part II addresses the unusually choleric aca-
demic debate surrounding two questions-whether Cyberspace is a
"place" and whether it should have its own laws. This debate has
reverted to its origins-it has become purely academic, a curiosity
of early Internet legal history. Courts and governments have not
been shy to exercise jurisdiction over Internet transactions. That,
and a lack of any real demand for a general online adjudicatory
authority, have scuttled dreams of a Cyberspace nation. But the
topic remains of interest. For while Cyberspace, as some sort of
imaginary kingdom, is not much more than farcical as a jurisdic-
tion, there are nonetheless placei on the Internet where private re-
gimes do exist, and deference to their waiver of real-space rules has
some cogency.
9 "PICS" stands for "Platform for Internet Content Selection." For a discussion of
PICS, see infra note 62.
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Again a focus on the application-and the differences between
applications-makes all the difference. A few applications (though
not many) are utterly unconcerned with real-space goals, and
rarely, if ever, have real-space effects-call them the "Internet as
an end." The pure examples are multi-player video games and
those online worlds called MUDs ("Multi-User Dungeons").0 For
these kinds of private groups, the normative argument for a private
set of rules is strong, just as for any private group in the real world.
This is not to say that mandatory rules would not be imposed
should, somehow, real-space consequences accrue-a conspiracy
made online should enjoy no immunity from prosecution. But just
as the National Hockey League sets the penalty for "tripping,"
there is no reason to preempt some similar kind of private order
among these groups.
Most Internet applications, however, are used simply as a
"means" to do exactly what one wanted to do anyhow. When I buy
my train ticket by packet rather than by dial tone it seems ludi-
crous to imagine that I suddenly become exclusively subject to
some strange Cyberlaw. This "ends/means" distinction-although
general and very far from infallible-provides guidance as to when
any talk of a private order will make any sense at all. And the an-
swer is that outside of a few, game-like examples, it almost never
makes sense to speak of a Cyberspace sovereignty that ought nor-
matively to be immune to real world jurisdiction.
The larger point is that thinking about the Internet as a homoge-
nous whole leads quickly to extreme results, usually stemming from
the choice of an analogy that only makes sense for one application.
And the same absurdity will often be true of regulation conceived
with one application in mind, yet then applied to the entire Inter-
net. For a future likely to be full of new and even more divergent
applications, it would be best to effect a hasty disposal of this old,
one-size-fits-all way of thinking.
10 For an explanation of MUDs, see infra note 86.
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I. WHEN THE INTERNET MET THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
PUBLIC INTERNET REGULATION
A
In 1997, the Internet met the First Amendment," and the result
of this encounter was the launch of a new rule. In case you are not
already well-acquainted, here it is:
"The Internet Gets Full First Amendment Protection."
A gr~at victory, this was, and quite a good rule (especially if the
only choice were between it and its logical opposite, "The Internet
Gets No First Amendment Protection"). But euphoria ought not
blind us to Reno v. A CL U's limits. The spirit and the political mes-
sage of Reno-a reprimand of broad and hastily conceived Internet
laws-may prove more significant and lasting than its content. We
may come to remember the mid-1990s as a crucial and dangerous
time for the Internet's development, a time where strong medicine
was needed to control government hysteria. But as a lasting First
Amendment principle, the Reno rule makes a poor bet, for it
groups into one constitutional box a huge range of highly variable
Internet usage, and this cannot last forever.
A source of this overinclusive approach is the common generali-
zation, echoed by the Supreme Court, that the Internet is a "me-
dium." Not an unreasonable generalization for a new manner of
transmitting information, perhaps, but in the world of the First
Amendment the word "medium" carries serious consequences. It
is used to draw a line around a group of ways to communicate and
to proclaim that a given level of constitutional scrutiny will apply
there." And so we find, for example, that broadcast radio is a First
n See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). A new round of litigation has just
begun following the passage of the Child Online Protection Act ("COPA"), a scaled-
back version of the Communications Decency Act ("CDA") whose application is lim-
ited to commercial purposes, the World Wide Web, and material that is harmful for
minors. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 231(a)(1) (West Supp. 1999); infra note 18 (discussing
COPA and the current litigation concerning it).
12Cf. Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Crimi-
nal Procedure, 86 Geo. L.J. 1153 (1998) (arguing that the criminal procedure regime
erected in the 1960s was a necessary response to the institutionalized racism of that
period but one that has largely outlived its utility under current conditions).13 This function is similar, in some respects, to judicial delineation of the boundaries
of a given public forum. See, e.g., Chicago Acorn v. Metropolitan Pier and Exposi-
1170 [Vol. 85:1163
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Amendment medium, that cable television is a First Amendment
medium (different from broadcast television), and that even snail
mail14 can be thought of as a First Amendment medium. All that
this means is that every way of communicating encompassed, for
example, by the phrase "cable television" gets the same treatment
under the First Amendment.
Yet this First Amendment meaning of the word "medium"
makes an exceptionally poor fit for the full range of existing and
possible Internet applications. A radio is pretty much a one trick
pony-a good trick, yes, but in essence there's only one way a per-
son can use a radio. But the Internet, to understate the obvious,
can be used in more than one way. Indeed it can even be used just
like a radio, telephone, or television-used to replicate the func-
tional characteristics of the existing "media" and then some.'5 If
these "media" each merit their own special constitutional consid-
eration, how can the Internet, capable of replicating all of these
media and adding some for good measure-be handled by one
simple paradigm? The constitutional meaning of "medium" is too
small for the Internet. It has outgrown its box.
At the level of case analysis, this problem manifests in a mis-
characterization that clouds Reno's analysis. Reno relied on the
district court's finding that "the Internet is not as 'invasive' as radio
or television.... 'Communications over the Internet do not 'in-
vade' an individual's home or appear on one's computer screen
tion Auth., 150 F.3d 695 (7th Cir. 1998) (dividing Chicago's Navy Pier into various
levels of constitutional scrutiny based on public forum analysis). Indeed, it would be
quite plausible to have had the entire initial argument over the First Amendment and
the Internet assume the cast of a public forum argument. This has not happened,
and, as it stands, neither the Supreme Court nor any federal appeals courts have put
the Internet and public forum in the same paragraph. So while it seems a little uncer-
tain whether public forum will ever catch on for Internet analysis, as David Gold-
stone reminds us, "Rome's forums were not built in a day; cyberspace's will not be
either." David J. Goldstone, A Funny Thing Happened on The Way to The Cyber
Forum: Public vs. Private in Cyberspace Speech, 69 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1998)
[hereinafter Goldstone, A Funny Thing Happened]; see also David J. Goldstone, The
Public Forum Doctrine in the Age of the Information Superhighway (Where Are The
Public Forums on The Information Superhighway?), 46 Hastings LJ. 335 (1995) (ear-
lier work on the same topic).
14 That is, regular mail-"snail-like" as compared to electronic mail.
15 Granted, some of this replication is not so great-especially what I am calling
"television"-but the functional features are the same.
1999] 1171
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unbidden. Users seldom encounter content 'by accident."' 16 Yet
the example of junk email-a terrible and unbidden nuisance-
shows that this characterization of the Internet is incorrect, for
junk email does arrive unbidden and does invade a user's inbox.
And yet this characterization was apparently critical to Justice
John Paul Stevens's conclusion that the Internet (as a whole) was
not to be subject to any reduced First Amendment scrutiny. In re-
ality, the invasiveness of the Internet cannot be ascertained at the
level of the entire Internet. Rather, the question must be answered
at the application level, for some applications are privacy-invasive,
and some are not. Praise is due for the first Internet decision of
our time, a step in the right direction, but praise ought not blind us
to its limits.
So the Reno v. ACLU rule looks to be an overgeneralization.' 8
But then it is not particularly unusual or unreasonable for case law
to begin with an overinclusive or underinclusive rule and then to
clarify matters later.19 It seems only a matter of time before the
Internet ceases to be considered as a single, uniform domain of
First Amendment scrutiny.20 Such things are hard to predict, but
perhaps the setting for this change will be the first constitutional
16 Reno, 521 U.S. at 869 (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa.
1996)).
17 The statement of facts describing the Internet does talk about email, see id. at
851, but the opinion rests its scrutiny-level analysis on facts that are only true of the
World Wide Web, i.e., that nothing appears without the user seeking it and that the
user is seldom surprised by unexpected content. See id. at 868-70.
18 It is doubtful that the latest round of Internet-indecency litigation will challenge
this oversight, as COPA was written to apply only to the World Wide Web. See 47
U.S.C.A. § 231(a)(1) (Supp. 1999). So far COPA has been held unconstitutional.
See ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473,476-77 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
19 Other, non-First Amendment, decisions have been far more application-specific.
See, e.g., Compuserve, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio
1997) (holding that the use of Compuserve's servers to send junk email without con-
sent is trespass to chattels).
20 Much of the debate between the rule in Reno v. ACLU and what I propose is re-
flected in the exchange between Justice Stephen Breyer and Justice Anthony Ken-
nedy in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC,
518 U.S. 727 (1996). Justice Kennedy supports the adoption of a categorical, all-
encompassing approach to the First Amendment, see id. at 780, 784-87 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring), while Justice Breyer prefers a narrow, hesitant, and technologically spe-
cific approach, see id. at 739-44 (Breyer, J., plurality opinion); see also id. at 774-78
(Souter, J., concurring) (rejecting Justice Kennedy's position, chiding, "First, do no
harm.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
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challenge to the regulation of email (provided a technical or eco-
nomic solution does not preempt a legal rescue). Reno's assurance
that "The Internet Gets Full First Amendment Protection" can
look pretty thin when there are 49,000 new messages in your inbox,
or when your so-called cyberlife consists of deleting ads for pyra-
mid schemes and porn sites. Nearly everyone hates junk email,
even cyberlibertarians (although many take comfort in their supe-
rior filtering skills), and there is a pretty simple reason why: Junk
email is invasive and offensive. Sound familiar? Indeed, spam21
may turn out to be "the seven dirty words" of the Internet;2 in its
wake, the monolith that now constitutes Internet First Amendment
analysis will witness its first partition.23
21 Spare has become a generic term for unwanted content, although it is most fre-
quently used (as here) as a synonym for junk email, typically unwanted solicitations
of a salacious or illegal nature. For more on spare, and the many campaigns organ-
ized to fight it, see Scott Hazen Mueller, Fight Spare on the Internet <http'/
spam.abuse.netl> (visited July 13, 1999), and the Coalition Against Unsolicited
Commercial Email ("CAUCE") <http://www.cauce.org> (visited July 13, 1999) [here-
inafter CAUCE website] ("Take Back Your Mailbox"). The topic of how exactly to
fight spare is interesting because it is an open question and something of a race of the
modalities of regulation. Will law, the market, social norms, or a technological ap-
proach ("the code") be the best weapon for killing spain? External social sanctions
were tried first, but they seem to have little effect on the people behind spare, the
"cyberpromoters" of the world. Technological solutions have been proposed and
implemented: Some people filter, and on Usenet, exotic solutions such as "cancel-
bots" (robots that find spare postings and delete them) have been popular. The mar-
ket, combined with social sanctions, may have the final say. See Christopher Jones,
Marketers Losing Taste for Spai, Wired News (Nov. 12, 1998) <httpJ/www.
wired.com/news/newsbusiness/story/16216.html>. Finally, there is always talk of fed-
eral legislation, such as an amendment to the federal "junk fax" law. See, e.g., H.R.
1748, 105th Cong. (1997). Some states, including Nevada, Washington, and Califor-
nia, have actually passed such legislation, although the approaches taken by these
states vary. See, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17511.1, 17538.4, 17538.45 (West
1997 & Supp. 1999); Wash. Rev. Code §§ 19.190.020, 19.190.030 (West 1999).
Groups such as CAUCE oppose the type of legislation that merely imposes labeling
requirements (such as the California law) to such a degree that they plan to challenge
it as compelled speech. See CAUCE website, supra. Obviously, junk email is not a
problem ideally handled at the state level; any federal legislation, if or when it is
passed, will preempt the state legislation.
2 Cf. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (upholding the possibility of
sanctioning George Carlin for his monologue on "the seven dirty words").
For an example of this kind of partition making, see Chicago Acorn v. Metropoli-
tan Pier and Exposition Authority, 150 F.3d 695 (7th Cir. 1998), where the Seventh
Circuit carefully divided Chicago's monolithic Navy Pier into several zones of differ-
ing First Amendment scrutiny.
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If junk email legislation is seriously tested, email will likely be
found a fitting place to apply intermediate scrutiny, a balancing
test, or an equivalent formula, stemming from a conclusion that
regulation of email is justified as a content-neutral time, place, and
manner restriction;24 or that there exists a captive audience, 2 or
perhaps even that junk email is commercial speech.26 Perhaps in
their consideration of such a case, courts will rely directly on
Rowan v. United States Post Office Department, which allowed the
state to facilitate the filtering of real mail.28 Courts might even say
that email is a "medium" or "modality" different from the World
Wide Web that merits different First Amendment treatment.29 In
the absence of a real case it is hard to say which litigation strategy
will work best, but it is the result, and the reason behind the result,
that matters here. Email spain is invasive, just like real mail is in-
vasive,3° incoming calls are invasive,3 abortion picketing outside
your front door is invasive,32 and so on. The underlying reasoning
is important because it lets us forecast the future of the Internet
and the First Amendment.
B
The example of junk email suggests a way to group Internet us-
age (and applications) for First Amendment purposes. By this
grouping, I want to specify what we can say, ex ante, based on the
technology alone; for of course, in individual cases, the content of
the speech (indecent speech, for example) will make a difference. I
think scrutiny will and should split in accordance with the invasion
of privacy attendant to usage, and this, of course, depends on the
14 Cf. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (explaining the time,
place, and manner analysis).
21 Cf. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 487 (1988) (explaining the captive audience
doctrine).
2 CL Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Conm'n, 447 U.S. 557,563
(1980) (explaining the commercial speech doctrine).
z' 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
28 See id. at 737-38.
21 Cf. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637-40 (1994) (treating cable
and broadcast television as different First Amendment media).
30 See Rowan, 397 U.S. at 737-38.
31 See Gormley v. Director, Conn. State Dep't of Probation, 632 F.2d 938, 942 (2d
Cir. 1980).
"I See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474,484-85 (1988).
1174 [Vol. 85:1163
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application being used. This yields a basic and unsurprising split be-
tween privacy-invasive and nonprivacy-invasive speech on the Inter-
net, which can be mapped to invasive and noninvasive applications.
The Supreme Court has a collection of "special reasons" to jus-
tify reduced scrutiny for a given "medium." Some, like a history of
extensiveovernment regulation33 and a scarcity of available fre-
quencies, have little relevance to the Internet. Yet another justi-
fication, stated usually as a communication's "invasive nature,"35
has teeth, for this justification stands directly at a collision between
a recognized individual right and the First Amendment. People
like their privacy, and the Supreme Court, perhaps eager to please,
recognized a right to privacy.36 And the data compiled in the
United States Reports shows us that when these two rights face off,
the First Amendment usually comes out the loser.37 This is particu-
"See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 399-400 (1969) (relying on
the spectrum scarcity of broadcast television to justify reduced scrutiny).
"See id.; see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637-39 (1994)
(noting the inapplicability of the scarcity rationale in the context of cable).
ISee, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,748-50 (1978) (stating that broad-
cast radio is invasive and accessible to children).
"See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,484-85 (1965).
"For Supreme Court cases in which the First Amendment lost out to asserted pri-
vacy interests, see Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (sound trucks); Rowan v.
United States Post Office Department, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (unsolicited mail); FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (radio broadcast to the home); and Frisby v.
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (focused picketing of a certain house). For cases in the
lower courts, see Gormley v. Director, Connecticut State Department of Probation,
632 F.2d 938, 942 (2d Cir. 1980) (harassing phone calls); Destination Ventures v.
FCC, 46 F.3d 54 (9th Cir. 1995) (junk faxes); and Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970 (9th Cir.
1995) (telemarketing). For the only instances in which the First Amendment has
really won invasion-of-the-home cases, see Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943)
(distinguished endlessly-see, for example, Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485
(1988)), and, more significantly, the publicity cases. See Florida Star v. BJ.F., 491
U.S. 524 (1989); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Time, Inc. v. Hill,
385 U.S. 374 (1967). These cases show that privacy interests, while formidable, can
still be taken to task by the real heavyweight champion of First Amendment case law,
the media defendant (especially when he asserts the "public's right to know"). See,
e.g., Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (media's right to open
trials). But two other cases, Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11
(1975), and Cohen Y. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), reinforce the focus on privacy,
holding that when someone is out for a drive or wandering around the courthouse,
privacy claims do not hold water and one needs to avert her gaze. For a nice over-
view of much of this unsavory business, see Michael W. Carroll, Garbage In: Emerg-
ing Media and Regulation of Unsolicited Commercial Solicitations, 11 Berkeley
Tech. LJ. 233 (1996).
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larly true when the right to privacy enjoys the home team advan-
tage: Annoying people in their homes is a cardinal sin in the world
of the First Amendment. The Supreme Court becomes likely to
say things like "protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy
of the home is certainly [an interest] of the highest order in a free
and civilized society. 3 ' As the sound trucks, ride-along journalists,
and bulk mailers of the world operate under a serious First Amend-
ment handicap, so will their equivalents in Cyberspace.
This perennial tension between privacy interests and the First
Amendment seems destined to play a starring role in the story of
Internet regulation. And since the Internet, as a whole, cannot be
branded privacy-invasive or noninvasive, the distinction has to be
made where the variability lies: the application. The tension be-
tween these two big rights seems likely to play out in a distinction
between applications that in usage are privacy-invasive and those
that are not.
This conclusion really only poses the question: Which applica-
tions are privacy-invasive and which are not? Luckily, we are not
without guides. Internet users like to use the words "pull" and
"push" to distinguish between content that you "go and get" and
that which "arrives unbidden., 39 And while hardly a perfect divi-
sion, it serves as a rough proxy for which types of Internet applica-
tions are privacy-invasive and which are not. Even though everything
"enters the home" (if your computer is at home), pull materials by
definition come bearing your specific invitation. That is, because a
user actively "goes out and visits" websites, when he clicks on "The
Starr Report," the consequences ought be no surprise. So pulled
material cannot be invasive, the argument goes, because the inva-
sion is consensual, and an invasion of privacy requires a lack of
consent. The idea is similar to the tort law principle that consent
negates liability for invasion of privacy.40 Push applications, on the
33 Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980) (dicta).
39 Among major applications this breaks down roughly as follows: The World Wide
Web (the HTML portions at least), Usenet, telnet, talk, and similar programs are
pull, while email, push channels, and most media streamers are push. But this is far
from a perfect dichotomy-consider, for example, when you click on a media
streamer from within the World Wide Web. The distinction is a starting point more
than the final word.
See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 892B (1977); id. cmt. c, illus. 1 (demonstrat-
ing that consent cures trespass liability).
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other hand, by definition, deliver materials without your specific
consent, as most email users (and all America Online ("AOL") us-
ers) well know. You do "set up" an email address or a push
channel, but only in the most meaningless way imaginable does
that mean you intended to consent to "Mr. Barlow has 15,308 new
messages."
This guide does not give all the answers. Reasonable people can
spend a long time disagreeing over what "consent" and "privacy"
really mean on the Internet; whether custom and common under-
standings can play a role; whether, for example, subscribing to a
certain listserv4' means you get everything you deserve, and
whether the World Wide Web really is privacy-invasive because of
the occasional surprises that it delivers (have you visitedwww.whitehouse.come lately?) And it also misses out on some
important invasions of privacy that are to be found outside of push
applications. But it suggests a guide for regulation of existing and
future Internet applications.
So what would a privacy-centered and application-specific First
Amendment law for the Internet look like? The rule would be
simple: Privacy-invasive technologies shall be subject to reduced
First Amendment scrutiny. And the results would be as follows.
Regulation of incoming junk email would be subject to reduced
scrutiny, especially if directed at commercial junk email. Regula-
tion of the various data "forms" on the World Wide Web (actually,
41 A "listserv" (also called an "email exploder") refers to a discussion group that
works over emails distributed to every member of a group. Listservs have a well-
known but unfortunate tendency to degenerate into spiteful and lengthy personal
spats between members, known as "flame wars." Since listservs operate by email, a
subscriber may return from a weekend away and find her mailbox clogged with hun-
dreds of messages full of all manners of personal invectives including, invariably,
cheap comparisons of adversaries to various leaders of the Third Reich.
42 <http://www.whitehouse.com> is a pornography site. Search engines and directo-
ries play an interesting role in all of this, as they frequently expose users to unex-
pected content. Note, for example, how a search for "AOL" in Yahoo turns up not
only AOL's websites but also protest sites like "Why AOL Sucks" and "The AOL
Haters Mecca." Indeed, search engine result pages are among the very few means on
the World Wide Web by which small scale protest and dissenting voices actually
reach the public. If public forum doctrine were functionally based rather than hope-
lessly linked to historical analysis then directory result pages might be called the
World Wide Web's public fora.
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CGI scripts43) that solicit personal information, and the treatment
of that personal information, would also be balanced for
reasonableness (especially when the solicitation is directed at
minors). Similarly, all of the applications ancillary to the World
Wide Web that process personal financial information for
transactional purposes would be subject to intermediate scrutiny.
Next, and perhaps obviously, any "speech" that involves an
unauthorized invasion of another's system would be regulated, and
indeed is already criminalized, under computer crime laws."
At bottom, the issue that bothers people on the Internet is pri-
vacy invasion. People seem to want the help of their governments,
and experience tells us that the First Amendment buckles when
privacy interests are threatened. 45
C
The Supreme Court's opinion in Reno v. ACLU is the most ob-
vious example of overly general Internet First Amendment analy-
sis. But the same problem tarnishes much of the voluminous
academic attention given to this topic, limiting the value of this
analysis.46
43 "CGI" stands for "common gateway interface," and "CGI scripts" are miniature
applications that can be associated with an HTML web page. The forms commonly
used on the Internet to collect user information usually rely on CGI scripts to process
the form and deliver the user's data to a host computer.
4See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1994).
4Unless fortified by the presence of a media defendant in the ring, that is. See su-
pra note 37.
"For a representative sample of articles in which this oversight is obvious and ex-
plicit, see, for example, Robert M. O'Neil, Free Speech on the Internet: Beyond "In-
decency," 38 Jurimetrics J. 617 (1998) (cataloging Internet First Amendment cases
with little regard to application-level variation); Glen 0. Robinson, The Electronic
First Amendment: An Essay for the New Age, 47 Duke LJ. 899 (1998) (comparing,
en masse, the electronic and print versions of the First Amendment); Mark S. Kende,
The Supreme Court's Approach to the First Amendment in Cyberspace: Free Speech
as Technology's Hand-Maiden, 14 Const. Comment. 465 (1998) (criticizing a posited
abandonment of First Amendment principle in the face of technological develop-
ment); Robert Reilly, Mapping Legal Metaphors in Cyberspace: Evolving The Un-
derlying Paradigm, 16 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 579 (1998) (calling for an
"organic" model of Cyberspace that would "view cyberspace as a place where a soci-
ety of people exist"); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., Converging First
Amendment Principles for Converging Communications Media, 104 Yale LJ. 1719
(1995) (envisioning a First Amendment doctrine essentially oblivious to context).
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The problem can also be more subtle: It is when the Internet-
wide assumptions are implicit that even the most careful analysis
has gone astray. Consider, for example, that scholars studying
speech on the Internet often take for granted that the Internet (as a
whole) is a great equalizer for matters of speech. Writers, most
famously Eugene Volokh, rest substantial portions of their analysis
on the notion that the Internet is a ready medium of "cheap
speech." 47 They are certainly correct that the minimal conception
of the Internet as a connection between every networked computer
does make many things cheaper for everyone. But, in reality, the
idea that speech is cheap and that all speakers are equally heard
There are some notable exceptions to this generalization. Lawrence Lessig has
been careful to distinguish among applications, famously cautioning against the all-
encompassing analogy. See Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 Yale L..
1743 (1995) [hereinafter, Lessig, The Path]. Most recently, he has emphasized the
distinction between push/pull and discriminatory/nondiscriminatory applications. See
Lawrence Lessig, What Things Regulate Speech: CDA 2.0 vs. Filtering, 38 Jurimet-
rics J. 629 (1998) [hereinafter Lessig, What Things]. David Goldstone's careful search
for public "cyber forums" on an application-specific basis is another exception. See
David J. Goldstone, A Funny Thing Happened, supra note 12, at 1, 4. Finally, care-
ful, code-specific thinking is also found in Andrew L. Shapiro, The Disappearance of
Cyberspace and the Rise of Code, 8 Seton Hall Cost. LJ. 703 (1998).
47 See, e.g. Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 Yale LJ. 1805
(1995) (arguing that cheap speech enabled by the Internet will bring a much more
democratic and diverse environment than we see now); Jerry Berman & Daniel J.
Weitzner, Abundance and User Control: Renewing the Democratic Heart of the First
Amendment in the Age of Interactive Media, 104 Yale L.i. 1619 (1995) (arguing that
the Internet removes barriers to entry into the marketplace of ideas that previously
interfered with full realization of the First Amendment's aims); Edward A. Cavazos,
The Idea Incubator: Why the Internet Poses Unique Problems for the First Amend-
ment, 8 Seton Hall Const. LJ. 667 (1998) (Internet lowers "speaker burden"); Robert
Kline, Freedom of Speech on the Electronic Village Green: Applying the First
Amendment Lessons of Cable Television to the Internet, 6 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y
23, 24-25 (1996) (maintaining that the Internet, by serving as "a wide-open, interac-
tive frontier that has no central control figure" and by allowing low-cost speech "pro-
vides for the exchange of ideas on a massive scale on a variety of topics limited only
by the human imagination"); Kathleen M. Sullivan, First Amendment Intermediaries
in the Age of Cyberspace, 45 UCLA L. Rev. 1653, 1669-71 (1998) (studying the dis-
intermediation in Internet communication while acknowledging that the relative
equality of Internet speech is a feature of the present only); Lee Tien, Who's Afraid
of Anonymous Speech? McIntyre and the Internet, 75 Or. L. Rev. 117 (1996); Fred
H. Cate, Indecency, Ignorance, and Intolerance: The First Amendment and the
Regulation of Electronic Expression, 1995 J. Online L. 5, 66 (Dec.) <http://www.
wm.edu/law/publications/ol/cate2.html> (arguing that the structure of the Internet
makes it an egalitarian medium where "the real test of expression and ideas is their
own value, not the status or affiliation of their source").
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increasingly depends on what application you are talking about.
The World Wide Web is the deviant, for the impact of a message
on the World Wide Web has already begun to depend heavily on
the identity (that is, mostly the wealth) of the speaker. The impact
of a website depends quite a bit on how good your web desig, (or
web designer) is, what domain name you manage to get, how
many banner advertisements you can buy, and what kind of fancy
plug-ins you can afford to support. (Indeed, media streamers like
realplayer49 may be the most "unequal" applications adhering to
the Internet.) And as search engines inevitably begin to charge
for "priority" listings, and heavy Java programming becomes in-
creasingly standard, the impact of the stereotypical little person's
site will likely continue to decrease. Add to this the increase in
competition stemming from the great financial incentives of own-
ing a high-traffic site, and the results look troubling for high-
impact web-based cheap speech. This is not to say that there are
not exceptions (with Matt Drudge's website serving as the arche-
type °) or that things have not changed, but that describing to-
day's World Wide Web as a free and open forum of equal speech
is a bit delusional.
These disparities do not hold true for forums like email listservs.
On a successful listserv everyone still basically looks the same.
Everyone gets her turn, and the impact of a message is still more or
41 Here, in addition to money, the ownership of a registered trademark makes a dif-
ference, because the owner of the registered trademark may challenge the "illegiti-
mate" owner of that domain name. See, e.g., Brookfield Communications, Inc. v.
West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999) (senior trademark
user granted preliminary injunction on junior user's use of trademark as domain
name); Giacalone v. Network Solutions, Inc., No. C-96 20434 RPA/PVT, 1996 WL
887734 (N.D. Cal. June 14,1996) (granting injunction in favor of trademark holder to
prevent another from using domain name identical to that trademark); see also, e.g.,
Network Solutions' Domain Name Dispute Policy, Dispute Policy § (8)(a) (visited
July 22, 1999) <http:lwww.jmls.edulcyber/docs/dnpol3.html> (providing that owner
of exactly matching trademark may challenge owner of domain name).
49 Media streamers use certain clever algorithms to send live sound or video in real-
time (i.e., without waiting for the entire file to download) whenever the viewer wants.
The result, given present bandwidth constraints, is a good "pull" version of radio,
but, at least for the present, is a very pale imitation of television's frame rate and pic-
ture size. For more information, see <http'/wwwrealplayer.com> (visited July 13,1999).
Matt Drudge runs a famous gossip column of low budget yet high impact that can
be found at <http://www.drudgereport.comlmatt.htm> (visited July 13,1999).
51 It is true that email addresses can be more or less prestigious, but this is a minor point.
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less correlated with the value (or lack of value) of what the speaker
has to say rather than with her net worth. On a listserv, it is still
true that no one knows you're a dog. This disparity between
lstservs and the World Wide Web proves a larger point: The lines
of the application control the question of speech-equality, and it
has become increasingly meaningless to speak generally of the In-
ternet as a whole as a medium of equal speech. Scholarship that
blindly brands the Internet or Cyberspace as this or that kind of
place for speech is missing the point.
This is not to downplay the impact the World Wide Web has had
on the way people get information. The disintermediation effects
of the World Wide Web (speakers being able to reach listeners
without the aid of intermediaries) are real,52 although one ought to
notice, parenthetically, that search engines are serious, if benign,
controllers of the power of listeners to actually find speakers in the
first place. The point is that these questions need to be sensitive to
their application context and not projected on the Internet as a whole.
Lawrence Lessig, among writers, must be said to be particularly
sensitive to the importance of the application; he urged the rejec-
tion of the single controlling analogy early ons3 and has continued
to focus on differences in speech-vending technology as between
applications.m Yet when it comes to one crucial, and favorite,
topic-change in the architecture of the Internet-he downplays
the saliency of application autonomy built into the Internet's archi-
tecture. Lessig tends to assume that change in the architecture of
Cyberspace will affect all applications simultaneously and similarly.
But for most purposes, it seems that few things (outside of a change
in the fundamental protocols and cross-application technologies,
considered below) would necessarily cause differing parts of the
Internet to change at the same speed or in the same direction. This
is a consequence of the layered architecture: The modular design
generally allows applications to change independently of one an-
other and the basic protocols. And I think it would be no surprise
to find different parts of the Internet changing in different direc-
On disintermediation, see Sullivan, supra note 47.
See Lessig, The Path, supra note 46, at 1745-47.
See, e.g., Lessig, What Things, supra note 46, at 644-45 (placing Internet applica-




tions, in response to the different demands. Financial websites
will never be big on user anonymity, but why a change to more
secure online trading cannot coexist with the anonymous MUD
culture is unclear to me. Instead, I think the more important the
Internet becomes, the more one might expect diversity in the fea-
tures of what it offers, as a reflection of the underlying demands
of society.
But Lessig's arguments are deeper than this. He focuses on
certain technologies-of which digital certificates55 are the best
example-with broad cross-application applicability. And such
technologies, set up as an auxiliary to all usage of the Internet,
could create a new baseline of regulability.56 In the digital certifi-
cate example, if using robust digital self-identification became ex-
pected in every aspect of Internet usage, then the former default of
a basically anonymous Internet would be replaced with an Internet
where basic information is known.
And so, this kind of change is a real possibility. A change as
fundamental as adding self-identification to every application op-
erates at a level relevant to all Internet usage. But the possible and
the probable are not the same thing, and it is important to notice
some of the obstacles. To represent a wholesale change, there
must be an agreed-upon standard that becomes a default require-
ment for all the major applications, so that users who wish to use
the Internet need to obey the standard or face annoying transac-
tion costs (the method of most regulation). Independent require-
ments are not the same-if your bank forces you to keep its
implementation of digital certificate technology on your computer,
this is a change, yes, and is even a net increase in Internet regula-
bility, but it lacks the significance of an Internet-wide change. But
setting up such a necessarily public standard presents collective ac-
Digital certificates are a system, based on an underlying public key encryption
technology, for robustly confirming the identity of the party with which you are
transacting-a need most obviously pressing when the transaction is financial in na-
ture. For more on digital certificates, see the ABA's Section of Science and Technol-
ogy, Electronic Commerce Division, Information Security Committee, Digital
Signature Guidelines (1996) (visited July 13, 1999) <httpJ/www.abanet.org/scitech/
eclisc/dsgfree.html>; A. Michael Froomkin, The Essential Role of Trusted Third Par-
ties in Electronic Commerce, 75 Or. L. Rev. 49,49 (1996).
56 See Lawrence Lessig, Code, and Other Laws of Cyberspace 42-48 (1999) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
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tion problems; the self-interests of private parties will mitigate to-
ward proprietary technology. Such problems are of course solv-
able-but I think it is clear that the crucial question is whether
government will take action.
Finally, the application-centered approach to thinking about the
Internet is nothing so denigrating as the school of thought best de-
scribed by its slogan: "the law of the horse."57 The basic idea is that
there is no real utility to the study of Cyberspace law as one field,
in particular because (1) law professors do not understand com-
puters ("the blind are not good trailblazers") 58 and 52) the best way
to study specialized topics is to study general rules. To the extent
that the "law of the horse" moniker is a criticism of overly general
Cyberspace writing, it echoes the ideas stated here. The problem
with this school of thought is that it ignores the analysis and regula-
tion that does make sense at the level of the whole Internet. The
big picture is sometimes worth thinking about-the Internet, after
all, can be thought of as nothing more than a global agreement to
use the same information transmission protocols. For a network to
be part of the Internet, it needs to "agree" to use the basic and
open Internet protocols, and lawyers like nothing better than
studying large agreements and their consequences. Just as the
Administrative Procedure Act anchors administrative law and the
tax code anchors tax law, study of the Internet also works from a
sufficiently general common denominator: the set of standards that
define the Internet.61
-1 This is the moniker usually used to belittle overheated Internet scholarship. Its
source is Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. Chi.
Legal F. 207. For one thing, electricity was a great advance over the horse. See also
Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 112 Harv. L.
Rev. (forthcoming Fall 1999).
m Easterbrook, supra note 57, at 207.
-1 See id.
60 Just consider all the time spent studying the agreement "to form a more perfect
union."
1, In addition, even though I urge that we have to be careful to think about the
Internet in a technically rigorous and application-specific manner, there is a lot going
on even within the confines of given applications. The World Wide Web and its
myriad of associated applications are a big topic; as I said earlier, Reno v. ACLU is a
great World Wide Web decision, and it seems there will be more to follow.
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No discussion of the Internet/First Amendment tryst would be
complete without some mention of the issues surrounding filtering
and the Platform for Internet Content Selection ("PICS"). Filter-
ing technologies generally allow users to block out unwanted con-
tent according to either a fixed database or self-set preferences (a
preference system, of course, requires a standard rating system and
actual rating of all the content on the Internet). 2 Filtering issues
are at present mainly relevant to the two most popular Internet
applications--email and the World Wide Web-although the con-
cept and technology has relevance to future and other existing ap-
plications. There are two big questions in filtering. First, even
without government involvement, whether labeling of all content
under one standard will become the norm. Second, if the gov-
ernment does try to push filtering, whether its actions will be con-
stitutional. What does an application-centered analysis tell us?
PICS is of particular interest, and the following is a short introduction. For more
thorough explanations of PICS technology, see Paul Resnick & James Miller, PICS:
Internet Access Controls Without Censorship, 39 Communications of the ACM 87
(1996) <http:llwww.w3.org/PICS/iacwcv2.htm>; R. Polk Wagner, Filters and the First
Amendment, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 755, 759-69 (1999) [hereinafter Wagner, Filters];
Jonathan Weinberg, Rating the Net, 19 Hastings Comm. & Ent. LJ. 453 (1997).
PICS, as a format to facilitating labeling and, ultimately, filtration, has two distin-
guishing features. First, PICS itself is described as "value-neutral" because the con-
tent of the labels and the criteria by which filtration occurs are not specified by the
PICS format itself. This, proponents claim, means that PICS can facilitate individual
choice instead of circumscribing it-the user may choose the rating agency of his
choice, as one might choose a movie critic. The second interesting feature of PICS is
that it may be used at any level, or is "vertically neutral." Thus, a PICS-based filtra-
tion system may exist at the browser level, resident in software such as Internet Ex-
plorer or Netscape Navigator. It is equally at home, however, at the server level, and
can be used to filter content available in an intranet or to the users of an Internet
Service Provider ("ISP").
No legislature has yet acted to legislate any form of labeling or blocking system,
although some state actors, of course, such as libraries, use blocking software. See
Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees, 2 F. Supp. 2d 783, 787 (E.D. Va. 1998).
At present there are different PICS-compliant labeling standards that enjoy varying
levels of use. See, for example, Net Shepherd, which has its own standard, at
<http://www.netshepherd.com> (visited July 13, 1999). There are also many less so-
phisticated blocking programs available that are designed mostly to protect children
from viewing indecent conduct and allow some customization. See, for example, the
programs available at <http://www.netnanny.com> (visited July 13, 1999); <http'I/
www.safesurf.com> (visited July 13, 1999); and <http://www.cybersitter.com> (visited
July 13,1999).
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First, notice that the incentive story differs by the type of Inter-
net usage (i.e., application) at issue. The full picture of the incen-
tives for every party to the filtering scene-content providers,
users, Internet Service Providers ("ISPs"), rating sites-is complex.
For our purposes it shall suffice to make a few observations. First,
notice that content providers have little independent interest in
self-labeling (but of course will respond to new incentives: If
enough users, or ISPs, block out unrated content, by default, con-
tent providers will need to self-label to be heard). The onus, ulti-
mately, to create self-labeling pressure, or public ratings, is on the
users. But then which users are strongly interested in filtering de-
pends on the usage in question. For an individual user-by this I
mean someone using the Internet for herself-the utility of filters is
in selecting desired content and avoiding unwanted content.
Hence, filters are very useful for email and other invasive applica-
tions (like ICQ) because the user lacks many other methods for
avoiding unwanted content. But the situation is quite different on
the World Wide Web. For the Web, unlike email, there are pow-
erful substitutes for achieving the goal of content selection. For
example, on the Web, search engines are a better developed sub-
stitute to filtering technologies for getting what you want and
avoiding what you do not. At a more basic level, that browsers
put the decision of whether to download content in the user's
hands means, basically, that the user can filter for herself. So in
contrast to email or other invasive applications, the user in her in-
dividual capacity has little interest in World Wide Web filtering.
Web filtering, rather, is beloved of those who want to control
what content is available to others. These are people like parents,
libraries, companies, and governments-in other words, paternal-
ists (though this is not meant in a pejorative sense). And for the
Web, whether labeling of content will become the norm depends
on the efforts of these paternalistic users. Yet two things make it
unlikely that these users will either provide public ratings of the en-
tire Web or try seriously to force individuals to self-label. First, a
collective action problem lurks behind any provision (or compul-
sion) of a single, public set of ratings. That is, even for the listeners
who want a single standard for filtering, it is rational to free-ride
off of either the public ratings of others or the efforts of others to
force content providers to self-label. Second, the availability of
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private filtering services, based on private databases, may be a
cheap and good enough substitute to erode the incentives of these
users to devote efforts toward establishing a public rating system or
enforcing self-rating. And it is perhaps these factors-the lack
of an incentive among individual users, the collective actioi
problem, and the appeasement effects of private database filter-
ing services-that have stunted, and will continue to stunt, the
emergence of a single, public, and free rating of the World Wide
Web.
That is, unless it is government that makes things happen. The
government has the power to push the architecture to an easily fil-
terable World Wide Web, or even to the entire Internet. But, of
course, when the government gets involved, so does the First
Amendment. And then everything depends on two issues: (1) the
type of action the government takes, and (2) the scope of Internet
usage affected (in other words, which applications are subject to
this type of regulation). The writing on this topic has focused on
the first issue6 and virtually ignored the second.
The second question, however, matters. Again, a split can be
seen between invasive and noninvasive applications. If govern-
ment limits its filtering legislation to facilitating the filtering of pri-
vacy-invasive applications (say, email), it will be far less likely to
run into First Amendment problems. Of course, certain types of
government action to regulate email will raise larger First
Amendment questions under doctrines like the compelled speech
doctrine." But the point is that no matter what the government ac-
tion is, it will have an easier case with a privacy invasion on its side.
Whatever the exact constitutional theory turns out to be, cases
from Rowan v. United States Post Office Departmento onward have
allowed the government to protect citizens against harassment and
torment in their homes. It is hard to imagine why an email inbox
See, for example, the thorough survey of governmental actions in Wagner, Filters,
supra note 62, at 769-812, and ACLU, Fahrenheit 451.2: Is Cyberspace Burning?: How
Rating and Blocking Proposals May Torch Free Speech on the Internet (1997).
See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (holding as uncon-
stitutional a requirement that campaign literature identify the speaker); Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (holding as unconstitutional a requirement that citizens
display slogan on license plate).




ought be much different. And so I think the various antispam bills
floating around state and federal legislatures, banning or facilitat-
ing filtration of junk email, should survive First Amendment scru-
tiny if drafted properly.
Broad-based regulation that reaches the World Wide Web poses
a harder question. Nearly everything depends entirely on what
government actually does to "help out" filtering-each type of ac-
tion leads to a different constitutional analysis. And so it is fairly
ridiculous to make the broad argument that PICS is or is not un-
constitutional. A better prediction follows the golden rule that un-
derlies First Amendment scrutiny (and constitutional scrutiny in
general): The more indirect and indeliberate the government ac-
tion, the better.6 7
A word, finally, on Lawrence Lessig and PICS. Lessig has not
been the greatest fan of PICS. He has at one point urged a rein-
carnation (though not a resurrection) of the CDA as a kind of
short-term sacrifice to solve the indecency problem without side-
effects.6 This concession might be no small sacrifice. Could such
an avowedly mild-mannered standard really be so dangerous to all
that is good about the Internet?
Lessig argues that filtration-facilitation by government would in-
exorably lead to a wholesale change in the Internet architecture, to
an architecture that facilitates speech discrimination.69 This is an
important warning. Unintended, even awful, consequences could
follow a theoretical model of coercive state-sponsored filtration-
including a tip-over into a closed World Wide Web environment
more reminiscent of the corporate Intranet model. This could be
especially true if a PICS rating requirement, meant for end-user fi-
"See the sources cited supra note 63 for analyses of possible government action
and attendant constitutional consequences.
67This conclusion is echoed by Wagner, Filters, supra note 62, at 812. On the point
that constitutional scrutiny needs to be driven by governmental purpose, see, for ex-
ample, Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) ("The government's
purpose is the controlling consideration."); Edmond v. Goldsmith, No. 98-4124, 1999
WL 458618, at *6 (7th Cir. July 7, 1999) (governmental purpose behind roadblocks is
essential to determining constitutionality).
6See Lessig, What Things, supra note 46, at 650-51.
6 See id. at 665-70 (arguing that lack of narrow tailoring will doom general filtering
legislation).
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tering, metastasized into widespread centralized filtration by dan-
gerous parties like large ISPs or search engines.
Yet there are reasons to doubt that PICS will be such a worry.
Ironically, third-party private rating services for the Web may be a
primary obstacle, because any move to create a universal rating
scheme that becomes understood as a default requirement needs to
be both demonstratively better and cheaper to set up and maintain
than paying for a private service. Even with indirect government
support, it is not immediately obvious that the incentives exist to
prompt a quick move to a fully self-rated (or publicly rated) World
Wide Web, let alone Internet. Drastic government action would
do the trick-for example, a law that mandated self-rating of all
content under a single standard would change the Internet over-
night. But such direct government action has a much higher
chance of being unconstitutional. It is also unclear that any such
drastic legislation is on its way.
So PICS may not amount to a repeal of the law of gravity. But
there is no denying that it is part of the general trend towards
Internet normalization (especially of the World Wide Web) in re-
sponse to the perceived needs of normal, rather than expert, users.
A persistent mistake has been to assume that the Internet will not
change, while assuming society will, and radically. On the con-
trary, we have changed the Internet more than the Internet has
changed us; the Earth's gravitational pull on Cyberspace has been
mightier than the reverse.
ITERLUDE: How THE NETWORK ARCHrECTURE OF THE
INTERNET AFFEcrs LEGAL ANALYSIS
Scrutiny of all things Internet flows smoothly when it heeds the
architecture of the Internet in a rigorous way. Understanding this
structure, admittedly, is not always easy. But think of the topic as
akin to understanding the structural allocation of power among
government institutions-knowing who is allowed to do what usu-
ally takes priority over substantive discussion. Similarly, since the
network architecture of the Internet can be perceived as effecting a
delegation of the power to code, understanding this architecture
can be essential before reaching the merits. Luckily, the Internet's
architecture is simpler than the government's, and, as we will see,
the design of the Internet evidences a clear choice. It grants great
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power over functionality-a proxy for usage-to the designers of
applications. And since aspects of human usage are the facts that
ultimately drive Internet analysis, the application is the beginning
of most legal analysis.
To understand this point, two comparatively simple but impor-
tant structural features of the Internet loom large. These are (1)
the "layered" architecture of the Internet, and (2) the "end-to-end"
design principle. Quite obviously these two design features were
not chosen for their legal consequences. Rather, concerns of effi-
ciency, modularity, scalability, and future flexibility drove the de-
sign of the Internet. But these choices nonetheless have a critical
impact on any legal analysis.
A Layered Architecture
What it means for a network to have a layered architecture,
viewed all at once, can be at first difficult to grasp, yet the idea is so
clever that it merits understanding.7 A network communication
between computers is a very complex operation. The essence of
network layering is a grand simplification by delegation to func-
tional submodules, the layers.7' Dividing one large task among
several layers has numerous advantages-it allows specialized effi-
ciency, organizational coherency, and future flexibility-and is
something we constantly see in the real world yet consider unre-
markable. Consider, as a way to understand this, what happens
when one lawyer uses the postal system to mail a legal argument to
another lawyer. The postal system is structured so that no one in
70 What follows is a highly simplified explanation. A more thorough explanation of
network architecture in general and layered architectures in particular can be found
in any basic data network text. See, e.g., Uyless Black, Data Networks: Concepts,
Theory, and Practice 269-88 (1989); John McConnell, Intemetworking Computer
Systems: Interconnecting Networks and Systems 14-31 (1988); Andrew S. Ta-
nenbaum, Computer Networks (3d ed. 1996). While these sources focus on the In-
ternational Organization for Standardization's Open Systems Interconnection (OSI)
Model, a model seven-layer network architecture useful for comparison and categori-
zation purposes, the underlying concepts are the same as those for the two-layer ar-
chitecture described here.
71 Those familiar with computer programming will recognize the logical parallel be-
tween a layered architecture and the basic programming technique known as struc-
tured programming (dividing a given program's tasks among functional modules with
clearly defined inputs). For a formal comparison of structured techniques and net-
work layering, see Black, supra note 70, at 273-75.
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the postal system needs to understand law (the language of the
lawyers) for the message to be successfully delivered. And, simi-
larly, neither lawyer need do anything more than understand the
rules on addressing and postage. This makes for a simple two-layer
network. The function of understanding the contents of the letter
has been delegated to a "higher" layer (in this case lawyers), and
the function of delivering the letter has been delegated to a
"lower" layer (the postal system).
<- Interpretation -4
Lawyer A (handled by lawyers) Lawyer B
<- Transport ->
(handled by postal system)
In this example, the postal level is called "lower" because it can be
seen as more fundamental. The lawyers need the postal system or
they cannot communicate at all; yet if the lawyers did not exist, the
postal system would continue to carry mail for doctors, scientists
and other interpreters of strange lingo. Notice also that the postal
system is more fundamental in the sense that it can set standards
that apply to everyone in the higher levels, regardless of who they
are. For example, the postal service could require that all enve-
lopes be blue. The higher-level users of the system would have no
choice but to comply.
Notice several things about a network so structured. First, it al-
lows an efficient specialization: That the postal system need not
understand law (or the content of any of the messages it carries)
dramatically reduces the burden on the post office and allows it to
focus on one task: delivering mail. Second, the system is very
flexible: The postal system can carry any type of message, and the
communication will be successful, provided that the person on the
other side understands it. This makes the postal system useful for a
wide variety of applications. Finally, the layers are modular: Were
the postal system to begin using spaceships to deliver its mail, the
[Vol. 85:11631190
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lawyers would be unaffected so long as the rules for postage and
writing addresses remained the same.
The Internet shares this same basic structure. Internet applica-
tions-email and so forth-operate separately from and above
the set of basic Internet protocols, known as TCP/IP. The Inter-
net's network architecture gives applications their own layer tQ
interpret the data they send to each other without worrying how
it got there. And the basic Internet protocols (with some excep-
tions not important here) are invariable and are used by all appli-
cations, much in the way that lawyers, plumbers, and doctors all
use the same postal system.
The basic network structure of the Internet looks as follows:
<- Application Protocols -4 Application
(vary by application) Layer
Transport <- Transport Protocol -4
Layers (usually TCP)
<- Network Protocol -4
(IP)
<- Link Protocol --
So while there are actually four layers in the Internet architecture,
for many purposes the most important distinction is between the
transport layers, the set of (mostly72) constant Internet protocols
that handle the basic data transmissions, and the interpretation
layers, the huge variety of possible applications that make use of
the data sent around by the transport layers. A reminder again that
72 It should be here admitted that there is actually more than one protocol that
serves the "packaging" function of TCP. The description I give is a simplification;
the various datagram packaging protocols serve essentially the same function.
1999] 1191
1192 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 85:1163
this description represents only the most basic aspects of the design;
readers who are interested in precisely how the TCP/IP protocols
function together are directed to the sources in the footnote.
End to-End Design
The decision to adopt a layered network architecture does not
answer the subsequent question: where, exactly to place network
function within this architecture. The architecture, alone, is an
empty shell-it suggests that the duty to code function will be dele-
gated among layers, but not how. Many functions could have
been made a part of the basic Internet protocols, or have been
left to the application layer. For example, most of what makes up
the email system could be made a part of the basic transmission
protocols of the Internet or left for the application designer to
decide.
Hence, the importance of the end-to-end design principle. This
principle, formally described as an argument in a famous paper
twenty years ago, holds that, wherever possible, function should
not be placed at the lower-levels of a network system-rather, eve-
rything possible should be left to the applications at the "ends." In
other words, the lower-level protocols should focus only on the
minimal function of transmitting data, and in all other respects be
kept as simple, unintrusive, and open as possible. This design phi-
losophy, along with a few others, underlies the architecture of the
Internet.
73 More in depth, yet still readable, introductions to TCP/IP include Peter Rybac-
zyk, Novell's Internet Plumbing Handbook (1998), and Matthew Flint Arnett et al.,
Inside TCP/IP (2d ed. 1995). An online introduction is Charles L. Hedrick, General
Description of the TCP/IP Protocols (1987) <http://oac3.hsc.uth.tmc.edu/staff/snew-
ton/tcp-tutoriallsec2.html>. A more thorough TCP/IP reference is Douglas E. Comer,
Internetworking with TCP/IP: Principles, Protocols, and Architecture (3d ed.
1995); a more general computer network reference is Tanenbaum, supra note 70.
Detailed technical descriptions of the TCP/IP protocols are contained in the
following Requests For Comments ("RFC"), the standards "legislation" of the
Internet: RFC 793 (visited July 13, 1999) <http//www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc793.html>
(TCP); RFC 791 (visited July 13, 1999) <http://www.faqs.orglrfcs/rfc791.html> (IP);
RFC 894 (visited July 13, 1999) <http://www.faqs.orglrfcs/rfc894.html> (Ethernet and
IP); RFC 882 (visited July 13, 1999) <http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc882.html> (name
servers).
74 See Saltzer et al., supra note 2.
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The original end-to-end paper, written by Jerome Saltzer, David
Reed, and David Clark, pressed the end-to-end argument as a nar-
row issue of efficiency. It argued that placing function at lower
levels would be redundant whenever the function in question could
not be achieved without the participation of the applications at the
"ends" of the connection.75 One can see intuitively that the less the
"engine" of any network needs concern itself with, the faster and
cheaper the network will be.
But an end-to-end design has deeper effects.76 The principle
amounts to a salutary delegation of the coding power in the Inter-
net structure to the designers of applications. It grants the maxi-
mum possible application autonomy, giving to the application
writers the freedom to achieve application goals in whatever man-
ner they see fit, and innovate whenever and however they like.
And at the same time, by confining the network itself to simple
functions of broad usage, the design avoids blocking out future ap-
plications unknown or unpredictable at the time of design. For ex-
ample, the World Wide Web was only a theoretical construct even
at the time the modern Internet protocols were adopted on Janu-
ary 1, 1983.n And at least in part as a result of these features, this
decade has witnessed an astonishing development both of Internet
applications existing at the beginnings of the Internet (like email)
and totally new and extremely innovative applications. All of this
might have been impossible, or at least difficult, if the Internet had
not had an end-to-end design.
The Internet's layered architecture and embedded end-to-end
design have created an Internet where coding power resides among
the designers of application. It allows-even encourages-an as-
toundingly large set of possible applications and ensures that there
is very little that is necessarily true about the Internet as a whole.
Hence, talk of the Internet as a whole will often be nonsensical, if not
now, then soon. This architectural reality strongly suggests that mean-
ingful legal analysis needs to focus on the level where variation, and
the power to code function, are found. In other words, legal analysis
of the Internet need begin to take application diversity seriously.
75 See id.
76 See Reed et al., supra note 3, at 72.
'n See id.; Rybaczyk, supra note 73, at 26.
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II. PRIVATE ORDERING: THE CURIOUS HISTORY OF
CYBERSPACE SOVEREIGNTY
Is Cyberspace a place? Should it have its own rules? These
questions once served as the focus of deeply acrimonious de-
bate. 8 One side called Cyberspace sovereign, while the other
equated the Internet with the telephone. Both, I want to suggest,
were wrong and right; wrong for the entire Internet, yet poten-
tially right about certain applications. The error was the same on
both sides: mistaking one way of using the Internet for the entire
Internet itself.
Today, the sovereignty debate has become academic. The
popularity of the Internet and the onset of serious commercial ac-
tivity has led directly to real legal disputes; real, that is, in the
sense of tangible injury and benefit. And, without terrible fuss,
courts in this country and elsewhere have proved neither incapable
of nor shy in deciding Internet cases.79 These predictable develop-
78 See, e.g., Llewellyn J. Gibbons, No Regulation, Government Regulation, or Self-
Regulation: Social Enforcement or Social Contracting for Governance in Cyberspace,
6 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 475 (1997); Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1199 (1998) [hereinafter Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy]; Jack L.
Goldsmith, The Internet and the Abiding Significance of Territorial Sovereignty, 5
Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 475 (1998); Steven M. Hanley, International Internet
Regulation: A Multinational Approach, 16 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 997
(1998); David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in Cy-
berspace, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1367 (1996) (stating the case for Cyberspace sovereignty);
Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of Cyberspace, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1403, 1407-10 (1996)
[hereinafter Lessig, Zones] (criticizing Johnson & Post, supra); Henry H. Perritt, Jr.,
The Internet as a Threat to Sovereignty? Thoughts on the Internet's Role in
Strengthening National and Global Governance, 5 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 423
(1998); David G. Post, The "Unsettled Paradox": The Internet, The State, and the
Consent of the Governed, 5 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 521 (1998) (delving into inter-
national relations theory); Shapiro, supra note 46; Timothy S. Wu, Note, Cyberspace
Sovereignty?-The Internet and the International System, 10 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 647
(1997) (attacking the descriptive assumption that the Internet is impossible to regu-
late). For a collection of some of these and other articles, see Borders in Cyberspace:
Information Policy and the Global Information Infrastructure (Brian Kahin &
Charles Nesson eds., 1997). For a quick overview of this debate, see the "Brain Ten-
nis" exchange between David Post and Jack Goldsmith in the Hotwired Archive
<http:/www.hotwired.comlsynapselbraintennis/97/34/nc left_intro.html> (visited July
13,1999).
'9 A Westlaw search shows 191 reported federal cases after 1995 that raise Internet-
related issues (the cases were isolated by searching the texts of Westlaw's synopses
and digests). These cases cover a huge spectrum, from trademark law to personal ju-
risdiction questions to obscure tort doctrines such as "trespass to chattels." See, e.g.,
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ments, and the lack of any serious demand for a Cyberspace-based
legal authority, have stillborn dreams of a Cyberspace nation.
From the beginning, it was clear that the descriptive argument-
the claim that Cyberspace cannot be regulated-would fall moot.'°
This old cyberlibertarian bromide self-destructs under the glare of
technical scrutiny8' and the simple recognition that regulation need
not be perfect to be effective-that regulation works through
transaction cost rather than hermetic seal.82 Consider for a mo-
ment the observation that a lock may be picked; interesting, no
doubt, but not a convincing demonstration that a lock cannot serve
any regulating function. Cyberlibertarians, some of whom have the
Internet skills equivalent to the real-space locksmith, generalize
from their own eserience to conclude that no regulation of Cyber-
space is possible. But neither the theory nor the results are con-
Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 174 F.3d 1036
(9th Cir. 1999) (trademark law); Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25 (2d
Cir. 1997) (personal jurisdictional questions); CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions,
Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (trespass to chattels). Significantly, in none
of these cases did a court decide that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. This
painless exercise of adjudicatory jurisdiction has been paralleled by a similar lack of
reluctance to exercise administrative and prescriptive jurisdiction.
Courts outside the United States seem to have similarly exercised jurisdiction with
little hesitation. See, e.g., 1267623 Ontario Inc. v. Nexx Online, Inc., No. C 20546/99,
1999 Ont. CJ. LEXIS 1289 (Ontario Super. Ct. June 14, 1999) (lawsuit in Canada
against a bulk emailer); Queneau v. Leroy, [1998] ECC 47 (T.G.I. 1997) (European
Court case of Internet copyright); British Telecomm. v. One In A Million Ltd., [1999]
1 W.L.R. 903 (C.A. 1998) (lawsuit in England against a fraudulent domain name
dealer); Alan Cowell, Head of German Web Sentenced for Pornography, N.Y.
Times, May 29, 1998, at A3.
For a thorough explanation of my view on this point, see Wu, supra note 78.
That note examines the technology behind Internet regulation and concludes that, as
a descriptive issue, regulation of the Internet is clearly possible (most effectively, us-
ing laws that compel the adoption of a certain architecture, as Singapore and China
have done), and that the interesting issue is whether or not states will want to impose
regulation on the Internet.
s The strongest evidence that this descriptive argument is essentially a grand hoax
comes from any examination of firewall technology, the highly developed security
technology that already walls off much of the Internet. See id. at 653. For a good in-
troduction, see John P. Wack & Lisa J. Carnahan, Keeping Your Site Comfortably
Secure: An Introduction to Internet Firewalls (National Inst. of Standards and Tech.
Special Publication No. 800-10, 1995) <http'//csrc.ncsl.nist.gov/nistpubs800-10/>.
" See Wu, supra note 78, at 650. This point has been oft-made. See, e.g., Gold-
smith, Against Cyberanarchy, supra note 78, at 1224-25; Lessig, Zones, supra note
78, at 1405.
Jeffrey Schiller makes the interesting argument that, because ordinary users can
quickly gain access to the security cracking tools of an expert, everyone on the Inter-
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vincing-if regulation is impossible, then what are criminal hack-
ers8 doing in prison?"
So what of this debate is left behind? I want to suggest that the
interesting questions about self-governance on the Internet remain
collected around particular parts of the Internet, often particular
applications, and not around "Cyberspace" as some kind of fantasy
kingdom. Notice that the normative case for state regulation of the
Internet depends on the application you have in mind. If you de-
cide to log onto an airline website to buy a plane ticket, there
doesn't seem to be any terribly convincing reason to treat this any
differently than the phone call that could have been made in its
stead. But for a group of MUDs users whose environment is en-
net can quickly become an expert security evader. See Jeffrey Schiller, Internet
Rights versus Internet Security, Talk Sponsored by the M.I.T. Technology and Cul-
ture Forum (Mar. 18, 1997). I think this conclusion rests on a fundamentally errone-
ous assumption about how much time and energy an ordinary user is willing to
commit to mastering arcane expert hacking tools for deeply modest returns.
84There exists a valiant, but perhaps hopeless, effort to try to preserve the term
"hacker" as a reference to those whose skill with computers exceeds the common
user's, and to distinguish "criminal hackers" as those who abuse their superhuman
powers.
5See United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996) (operators of obscene
bulletin board system sentenced to federal prison); United States v. Morris, 928 F.2d
504 (2d Cir. 1991) (Bob Morris, originator of the Internet worm, sentenced to fine
and probation); Andrew Blankstein, Hacker Sentenced to Prison, Told to Avoid
High Technology, L.A. Times, June 29, 1997, at B3 (famous hacker Kevin Mitnick
sentenced to prison); Paula Span, Modem Operandi: Phiber Optik, the Bad Boy
Hacker, Out of Stir and On-Line, Wash. Post, Jan. 13, 1995, at Bi; infra notes 102,
104-05 and accompanying text (death threat by email, defamation, and securities
fraud).
"A MUD is a program running on a remote server that creates a virtual environ-
ment that can be accessed by remote users, who assume the identity of characters in
that world. MUDs vary. Some are actually games, some are purely social, and many
have special themes (e.g. everyone plays an animal or perhaps a Star Trek character.)
A MUD user typically has a high degree of control over her own identity as it ap-
pears to other users, and can walk around the "world" interacting with other users or
other objects situated in the MUD, usually organized by "room." At a higher level,
users can create and program their own objects, including the possibility of creating
(somewhat) artificially intelligent objects (robots). Finally, there are many MUD-
type programs with similar names, such as MOO (MUD, Object Oriented), MUSH
(Multi-User Shared Hallucination), TinyMUD and TinyMOO, and LPMUD (role-
playing MUD).
What makes MUDs particularly interesting is that they offer human interaction in
an entirely user-created world, with user-created identities. Since the powers that
characters have can lead to abuse of others, there are typically rules or laws in a
MUD, enforced, if necessary by "Wizard" figures who have greater (technical) pow-
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tirely virtual and who perhaps see their physical lives as distinctly
secondary, allowing this group of people to make their own rules
does not seem outrageous. It is the crossover that is outrageous:
the suggestion that my online ticket purchase becomes governed by
some weird law of Cyberspace because I used a packet instead of a
dial tone or the idea that the U.S. Congress ought to enact the
membership rules of LambdaMOO (a popular MUD).7
But make no mistake about the bottom line. The second, self-
contained type of Internet usage is only a fraction of total usage-
and, more importantly, a type of Internet usage deeply unlikely to
trigger any legal consequence. Much Internet usage, rather, has
significant real-space effects, and with such effects comes the nor-
mative case for jurisdiction.8' Even if there were a parallel author-
ity in Cyberspace (beyond that created by contract), the existence
of concurrent jurisdiction is nothing particularly surprising to a
twentieth century legal systemY So only the few applications with
ers to do things such as delete a certain character from the MUD. MUDs also offer
the possibility of an environment and identity ultimately customizable to individual
preference; for these reasons, a well known MUDism holds that users see their real
lives as just another, less interesting window.
Social scientists have an unsatiable fascination with MUDs, and the literature on
the sociology of MUDs is vast-there is even a refereed academic MUD journal. For
some of the most famous writings on MUDs, see Sherry Turkle, Life on the Screen:
Identity in the Age of the Internet (1995) (providing an excellent introduction);
Julian Dibbell, A Rape in Cyberspace, Village Voice, Dec. 21, 1993, at 36. The Jour-
nal of MUD Research can be found at <http:ljoumal.tinymush.orgl-jomr/> (visited
July 13, 1999), and a lengthy collection of MUD-related academic papers can be
found in the "Lost Library of MOO" at <http://lucien.berkeley.edu/moo.html> (vis-
ited July 13, 1999).
17 The telnet site from which to enter the famous LambdaMOO (running out of
Xerox Park) is <telnet://lambda.moo.mud.org> port 8888, and visiting there is defi-
nitely a worthwhile experience. It must be warned, however, that the expert users
already there have a tendency to be somewhat impatient and abusive with newcom-
ers. As their gateway page itself states:
LambdaMOO is a new kind of society, where thousands of people voluntarily
come together from all over the world. What these people say or do may not
always be to your liking; as when visiting any international city, it is wise to be
careful who you associate with and what you say.
Id.
Cf. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§§ 402(1)(c), 403,4210) (1987) (stating that "substantial effect" is a basis for prescrip-
tive and adjudicatory jurisdiction).
9 This is not to say that concurrent jurisdiction does not raise tough issues, but it is
nonetheless a nearly unavoidable fact of life in a world with more than one legal ju-
risdiction, and events that implicate more than one state. See Mark W. Janis, An In-
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basically no real-space effect-mostly, consensual fantasy worlds
like MUDs-have any serious normative claim to immunity for
things that happen "there." And so we can see that the manipula-
tion of the MUD model into an analogy for all of Cyberspace is
what created this fallacious debate in the first place. It makes a
perfect example of mistaking the features of an application for
those of the entire Internet, and the whole discussion seems des-
tined to become a curious relic of early Internet history.
This is actually an exceedingly generous treatment of the issue,
for it makes the kindly assumption that the development of some
kind of general Cyberspace regulatory authority is somewhat plau-
sible.9° It is hard to even consider granting comity to "Cyberspace"
lacking anyone to grant comity to. And as it happens, this assump-
tion is more for fun than anything else; Star Wars without hyper-
space would be a boring movie. But in this galaxy the prospects
are remote at best. There will, of course, always be some private
ordering-internal rules for web hosting, MUD codes of conduct,
domain names, and so on. But a Cyberspace-wide authority that
regulates every transaction that happens to run through the Inter-
net looks about as likely as a city on the bottom of the ocean. Like
the ocean city, the main problem is that somebody has to want it.
No one does. Telling is the humorous fate of the "Virtual Magis-
trate" project: The Virtual Magistrate has apparently retired from
Cyberspace adjudication, and ironically has become a font for ad-
vice on real-space law.9'
troduction to International Law 249 (1988) ("There actually are countless such cases
of concurrent jurisdiction .... "). Complex rules have evolved to attempt to handle
problems of concurrent jurisdiction. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States §§ 401-33 (1987).
91 On the feasibility of a Cyberspace-based legal authority, see Margaret Jane
Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The Myth of Private Ordering: Rediscovering Legal
Realism in Cyberspace, 74 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. (forthcoming 1999). These authors
stress the lack of a realistic mechanism for enforcement of any Cyberspace re-
gime's rules.
91 The Virtual Magistrate is, according to its website, "a specialized, on-line arbitra-
tion and fact-finding system for [online] disputes" run by the Villanova Center for
Information Law and Policy <http://vmag.vcilp.org> (visited July 13, 1999). Unfor-
tunately, the Virtual Magistrate appears to have taken an extended recess (three
years and counting), with no indication of when he might return. In his more active
days the VM did arbitrate one case ordering AOL to remove an advertisement for
junk email from its system, yet it is unclear whether AOL ever actually complied with
the order, or what the VM would have done if AOL didn't. The site has instead be-
come, for unknown reasons, a forum for terse legal advice on a variety of issues-
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So there is no case for deference to Cyberspace as some kind of
empire of our imagination. But I think there are nonetheless in-
stances where particular types of Internet usage constitute the kind
of private regime, familiar in our world, that can waive all but
mandatory regulation by states-in effect, a private contractual or-
der. And in such cases states and courts ought to respect generally
the waivers and the rules set up by these private regimes, as they
do for any private order set up by any private group. But where,
on the Internet, is this appropriate?
The easiest thing to do is to look at the Internet usage in ques-
tion and ask what, exactly, the parties have agreed to through that
usage. But generally, the variation, unsurprisingly, is found be-
tween applications. The observed variance in how "contained" an
application is suggests a useful guide. It suggests a basic distinction
between what can be called the Internet as a means and the Inter-
net as an end?9
By the Internet as a means, I have in mind the more mundane
use of the Internet to serve as an alternative (perhaps an enhanced
alternative) to a preexisting means of achieving a preexisting objec-
tive. The crucial issue is the presence of tangible, real-space effect.
So you might buy a plane ticket through the World Wide Web, is-
sue a death threat by email, or make an Internet phone call. You
happen to use Internet packets to do so instead of using preexisting
means; hence, the Internet as a means. By Internet as an end, I
mean usage directed towards ends created by the online environ-
ment itself. As a result, real-space consequence is minimal. The
really "pure" examples of this are the popular online games like
Ultima Online9 or network Quake,94 which are multi-user versions
from leaseholds to sexual harassment-from parties of unclear associations. See Vir-
tual Magistrate Discussion Area, Conference Room 109 (visited July 13, 1999)
<http'/lwww.cilp.orgcgi-securelconfcenter/109/>.. For another virtual court proposal, see
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 Viii. L. Rev. 1, 100-01 (1996)
(proposing a "United States District Court for the District of Cyberspace" but con-
ceding that the Seventh Amendment issues would be troublesome).
92An alternative nomenclature might be the distinction between Cyberspace
(Internet as an end) and Internet (Internet as a means), but this also might cause
more confusion than it cures.
Ultima Online allows thousands of players (currently 90,000) simultaneously to
play the same multi-user fantasy based game, all taking place in the same, large world
(Britannica). The programmers attempted to write into the Ultima code a compli-
cated social structure that would provide rewards for altruism to maintain social or-
der and to create an online economy (although these attempts, in the first editions,
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of computer video games. Real-world goals aren't terribly impor-
tant to players of Ultima Online (in that capacity); the goals are
created by the game itself, and, for example, no one sues another
character if she dies. MUDs are a strong secondary example and
are often more interesting because of their highly developed set of
social norms and "Wizard"-enforced rules based on repeated inter-
actions. Lesser examples are various types of chatrooms and dis-
cussion groups like Usenet. But ,notice that for all of these types
of activities, the moniker "Cyberspace" suddenly has a resonance
that just seems lacking when I use email to schedule my dentist
appointment.
Obviously this is an imperfect dichotomy. First, of course, even
the "Internet as an End" applications have some real-space effects.
So long as we retain a physical manifestation, there will be no total
escape from real-world consequences. And this helps explain why
the normative case for full immunity is so weak.
Second, and more interestingly, there is a huge category of In-
ternet usage that achieves preexisting goals in new ways-ways
that change the way we think of things and perhaps even the way
we need to regulate things 5 And because laws and other forms of
regulation are usually premised on a set of assumptions about the
context in which they will operate, a change in a technological
have largely been a failure). See Thierry Nguyen, Origin's Epic Online Game Is
Snared by Bugs and Design Problems, Computer Gaming World, Feb. 1, 1998, at 162.
But the product is making money, and at a recent press conference Origin, the com-
pany that created Ultima Online, revealed that usage averages out to 3.5 hours per
user per day. See Omar L. Gallaga, Ultima Online's Success Better Than Expected:
Origin's Garriott Says He's Comfortable on the Business Side of Gaming, Austin
Am.-Statesman, Oct. 8, 1998, at Cl.
Interestingly, Ultima Online has not been immune to real world law. A group of
disgruntled gamers has sued the publisher of Ultima Online for providing a game that
allegedly failed to live up to its hype. See Michael Hawash, The UO Lawsuit: Garn-
ers Sue Electronic Arts, Origin Systems, Saying Ultima Online Was Misrepresented,
Computer Gaming World, Nov. 1, 1998, at 46. The Ultima Online website is at
<http://www.owo.com> (visited July 13, 1999).
94 Quake is a popular and less sophisticated "shoot 'em up" game that can be
played over the Internet; it also has online "clans" associated with it and a certain
etiquette that prohibits, among other things, using robots to aim for you. See Net-
work Quake Newbie Guide (visited July 13, 1999) <http-//www.gamers.com/fea-
tures/1997-12/14-quake_newbie/home.asp>.
95 Lawrence Lessig has explored these issues in great depth. For a representative




"fact," even if apparently unrelated to the law, may nonetheless
have large unexpected effects on the operation of that law. "Inter-
netization" typically results in a massive reallocation of transaction
costs; this tends to lay bare those laws that (unknowingly) relied
heavily on those costs as a kind of regulatory "crutch." This ef-
fect has been demonstrated with great clarity by the example of
online porn, which we might think of as regular porn minus trans-
action costs. But although these effects cloud the picture, they
still, in my view, do not create any constant normative presump-
tion against "regular" laws, other than for reasons of prudence
and ripeness. 7
So this just suggests that the normative case for a distinct regime
of rules depends on what usage or application on the Internet you
are talking about. But descriptively, we know that very few exist-
ing usages of the Internet have a good normative case for immunity
to real-space law. It is true that members of LambdaMOO ought
be the ones to set the rules of their world; it makes little sense for
the government to try to legislate the law of Lambda because most
MUD activity affects only the people involved. Like any group of
individuals, they ought be allowed to make their own rules for their
activities, just as the National Hockey League, not the Attorney
General, sets the penalties for "high-sticking." And, of course, this
isn't particularly different from saying that it probably works better
if we let any special group set its own rules, be it the member
LambdaMOOers or the Shasta County Cattlemen9 After all,
Robert Ellickson tells us that these group norms will be welfare
maximizing.99 This being said, agreeing that people ought to make
their own rules for their own game does not compel any conclusion
that participants should gain some shield from mandatory law
As was pointed out earlier, laws usually operate to increase the costs of a given
activity rather than to somehow prevent that activity entirely.
1 On this point, see Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium,
Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727,774-78 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring) (arguing for gradual-
ist regulation of new technology); Lessig, The Path, supra note 46, at 1745 (stating
that "if we had to decide today ... just what the First Amendment should mean in
cyberspace... we would get it fundamentally wrong").
1 The norms governing the relations of the Shasta County Cattlemen are studied in
great depth in Robert Ellickson, Order Without Law (1991).
19 See id. at 167-87.
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(such as the criminal laws), other than from consent.' ° To the ex-
tent that, for MUDs, outside effects are a rarity-a function of the
application-the presence of mandatory law is barely felt.'
0'
But here as there, as soon as signs of real-world consequences
begin to show up, the case for any distance from territorial regula-
tion weakens correspondingly. And finally, when a death threat
arrives by email instead of by letter"°2 nobody bothers to argue that
the Virtual Magistrate ought to jump in and preempt territorial
criminal law (or that she is even capable of doing so).
All of this strongly suggests that talk of a thick Cyberspace sov-
ereignty is really convincing only when talking about MUDs, video
games, or other exercises of fantasy, because it is only when using
these kinds of programs that the Cyberlibertarian point about self-
contained online activity makes any sense. Move along to chat
rooms and real-time "talk" applications like ICQ,'O' and the norma-
tive argument for private order begins to thin; certainly an antitrust
conspiracy made over ICQ has no special shield. Enter discussion
groups or anything else that looks like one-to-many communica-
tion, and suddenly things like defamation laws' or securities
101 Jack Goldsmith, drawing on conflicts law, points out the default law/mandatory
law distinction, noting that default laws can be modified to fit the needs of the par-
ties, but mandatory laws cannot. See Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, supra note
78, at 1209-12.
101 For extensive study of the relationships between formal law and informal norms,
see the work of Lisa Bernstein. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Mer-
chant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1765 (1996); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Con-
tractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. Legal Stud. 115 (1992).
102 See, e.g., United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997) (reversing
threat conviction but without regard to use of email as means of communication);
Thao Hua, Ex-Student Sentenced for Hate E-Mail Courts: Richard Machado is Fined
$1,000, Put on Probation for Threatening Asian American Students, L.A. Times, May
5, 1998, at A24. See generally Brooke A. Masters, When E-Mail is a Weapon, Vic-
tims Struggle for Protection, Wash. Post, Nov. 1, 1998, at BI (listing cases of email
harassment and threat convictions).
13 ICQ ("I Seek You") is a program that facilitates online chat by allowing users to
search for friends and associates online and then chat via a shared window. For more
see the materials at <http://www.icq.com> (visited July 13, 1999).
104See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1998) (lawsuit against




laws °5 begin to make their presence felt. When an application has
spillover-real-space effects-the jurisdictional questions are all
too familiar to the student of international law.Y10
6
The debate over Cyberspace sovereignty has been swallowed by
recent history. Cyberspace, as one unit, is not about to become a
sovereign jurisdiction, not in this galaxy at least. But what applica-
tion-centered analysis tells us is that there are interesting questions
about private ordering on the Internet, and that they revolve
around particular usages and applications. The application level is
where the open architecture of the Internet leaves real room for
private regimes. But the overarching lesson from this historical cu-
riosity is that manipulation of analogy; one concept of what the
Internet "is" can lead quickly to total nonsense.
CONCLUSION
Let me end this Essay with a less serious observation, one that
has been expressed before in different ways.1O The latest rounds of
Internet sloganeering have been the talk of a funny kind of vested
interest-not the usual suspects, but a kind of Madisonian notable
of the computer age best known as the "expert user."'' 8 The fight
over these slogans and over First Amendment scrutiny exposes an
interesting running battle between these entrenched expert users
(and those who consider themselves such) and newcomer normal
users. Expert users like the slogans. Why? Because expert users suf-
fer least and benefit most from an unregulated Internet. Remem-
ber, after all, who actually uses encryption software and who still
needs help opening attachments; who knows what mp3s are and
how to get them and who just pays more for CDs at the store; and,
I05 The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") appears to have become very
active in its enforcement of securities laws online. In October 1998 the SEC an-
nounced the results of the first nationwide Internet securities fraud sweep, involving
charges being filed against 44 people in 23 actions, mostly for stock touting online.
See SEC Does a 'Net Sweep and Charges 44, Nat'l LJ. Nov. 9, 1998, at A9. For de-
tails on these lawsuits, see SEC Litigation Releases <http://www.sec.gov/enforce
litig.htm> (visited July 13, 1999).
106 See Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, supra note 78, at 1212-39.
107 See, e.g., Jonathan Zittrain, The Rise and Fall of Sysopdom, 10 Harv. J.L. & Tech.
495 (1997).
'1 For more on Madisonian notables, see Roberto Mangabeira Unger, What Should
Legal Analysis Become? (1996).
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of course, who knows how to disable Microsoft Explorer's domina-
tion of the desktop and who ends up stuck with it. The truth is that
normal users might one day (or perhaps now) want the help of
their government in some or all of these areas. Or they might not.
The problem is that the constitutional law of Cyberspace, as it is,
wants to make this choice in advance and encase it in concrete.
The sentiment is well-intentioned and also well-argued. But to
stick everyone with the constitution of the expert user may, in the
long run, prove the inexpert move, as it may do more to close out
the Internet than flexibility ever would.
